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THE MALDISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGES
IN WRONGFUL DEATH
DAMAGE INTERESTS IN WRONGFUL DEATH,
JUDGMENTS AND RELEASES DURING LIFE
JOHN J. DUFFEY*
Sometimes courts, like the tailor, must cut and fit, making shift
with what is given them. Clothes tend to become disreputable with age.
Laws tend to become more reputable-even though they were an ill-fit.
The law of damages which result from wrongful death has acquired a
number of wrinkles in the passage of time, and not a few holes. This
article is confined to a critique, in broad outline, of the distribution or
allocation of such damages. It deals primarily with the recognition and
protection accorded the various classes of person affected by a wrongful
death. Although other approachs to wrongful death are inserted for com-
parison purposes, the main discussion is on -he effect of statutes creating
a new cause of action in the decedent's dependents-popularly called
"Lord Campbell" statutes.
In 1846, Lord Campbell introduced his well-intentioned and long
overdue attempt to destroy the harsh common law rules which prevented
recovery for wrongful death.' About the same time, and partially as a
result of the English statute, reform movements exploded throughout
America. As in most explosions, the result was quite a mess. After over
a century, the debris has settled enough to give answer to most questions
on a per state basis, although some issues are still obscured by the dust.
Several different approaches to the problem have emerged. However,
even in states which have similar statutes, agreement on details is absent
to a conspicuous degree. The discussion here is only general and no
attempt has been made to document the shadings of view.
GENERAL APPROACHES
Two types of statutes have direct bearing on recovery for wrongful
death. A "survival" statute is one which, generally speaking, simply
abrogates the common law rule that death terminates the cause of action
for personal injury.2 The cause of action which arose in the decedent
during life is transferred or survives to his personal representative. 3 Any
recovery is administered as an asset of the decedent's estate.
*Assistant Professor, Ohio State University, College of Law.
1 Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vicr., c. 93, commonly referred to as
"Lord Campbell's Act." Under the common law, the death of either party termi-
nated the injured person's cause of action. No cause of action was recognized for
the damage suffered by other persons as a result of the death of the injured person.
2 E.g. OHIO REv. CODE §2305.21.
3 Technically, "survival" applies where no suit was brought before death
and "revival" applies where death occurs while a suit is pending. See OHio REv.
DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DEATH
A "wrongful death" statute is one patterned on Lord Campbell's
Act. It creates a new cause of action in the next of kin or others desig-
nated by the statute for the loss to them resulting from the death.4
Procedurally, the action is brought by the decedent's personal representa-
tive, but it is for the exclusive benefit of the statutory beneficiaries.
5
Any recovery is generally administered under special statutory provisions
and is not considered or administered as an asset of the decedent's estate.
At present, there are three major approachs to damages for wrong-
ful death. These may be identified as those states which have:
1. Only a survival statute, and only one action is possible. These
will be referred to as "survival" states. 6
2. A survival statute and a wrongful death statute and two actions
can be brought and two recoveries obtained, one under each statute.7
The actions usually can be brought at separate times or concurrently.'
These are "two-remedy" states.
3. A survival statute and a wrongful death statute but only one
recovery is possible.9 The statutes are considered as mutually exclusive-
when one applies the other does not.
DAMAGE INTERESTS
Wrongful death is frequently referred to as an invasion of the
decedent's interest in his person and property." However useful that
CODE §§2311.21-.37. In the context of wrongful death, the distinction should be,
but has not necessarily been, merely procedural. Cf. Muldowney v. Illinois Central
Ry. Co., 36 Iowa 462 (1873).
4 Technically., wrongful death statutes change the common law rule that
refused recognition to a cause of action in other persons for death caused by in-
juries and do not affect the rule which terminated the injured person's caused by
action.
5 See OHIO REV. CODE §§2125.01-.04; May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St.
110, 165 N.E. 576 (1929). But cf. ORE. REV. STAT. §30.020, infra note 31.
6 One curious detail of this approach, at least in earlier years, was the
problem of "instantaneous" death. If a man died "instantly" no cause of action
ever arose in him and logically there was nothing to "survive" to the personal
representative. Rigid adherence to this logic created an arbitrary gap in the
coverage of wrongful death. In the light of modern medical knowledge, it would
seem almost impossible instantly to kill a person, except in the narrow sense that
his heart may be instantly stopped.
7 "Instantaneous" death may bar the survival action. Should the American
courts ever recognize shortened or decreased life itself as a distinct item of non-
pecuniary injury to a living plaintiff, it would seem probable that the recovery
would also be allowed under the survival statute. That is the English law. See
Smith, Psychic Interest in One's O'wn Life, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1950).
8Required or permissive joinder in one suit is a distinct problem of its own.
See Wills, Wrongful Death and Personal Injuries-Joinder of Causes of Action
and Counterclaims, 16 OHIo ST. L.J. 501 (1955).
9Procedurally, it may be permissible to file on both causes of action but
recovery is limited to one theory or the other. See Carbary v. Detroit United Ry.,
157 Mich. 683, 122 N.W. 367 (1909).
10E.g. 44 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1931); REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COM-
MISSION [OF NEW YORK] 204 (1935).
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statement may be for other purposes, it is obviously only figurative and,
from the viewpoint of compensatory damages, tends to cloud recognition
of the damages resulting from death. One cannot compensate a dead
body, nor an estate. A dead 'body is a thing, not a person. An estate is
simply a legal concept employed for the purpose of adjusting the inter-
ests of living persons in assets formerly owned by the decedent. Ana-
lytically, there are two damage interests which arise from a wrongful
death-the decedent's creditors, and the dependents and others who
would have received economic benefit from the decedent or who suffer
direct injuries arising from mental distress and loss of decedent's services.
It would seem apparent that creditors have a substantial economic
interest in a debtor's life. Every creditor, whether legally secured or
unsecured, relies principally upon the debtor's earning capacity in ex-
tending credit. Mortgages and other collateral are in fact merely a
backstop against inability to pay out of income. The creditor expects
payment from prospective earnings--especially in the case of personal
loans to a wage earner. The wrongful destruction of earning capacity
necessarily injures every creditor by impairing the most basic security-
an expectation of repayment from income. Depending on the amount of
other assets the decedent held, the result can be substantial monetary loss
to the creditor."
Dependents, relatives and others may show a pecuniary interest arising
from their expectation of economic benefit. The identification of those
in this class, and the determination of the extent of their expectation,
is obviously a problem of reasonable probabilities. Some of this class
may also claim a direct non-pecuniary injury in the mental distress, loss
of companionship, etc., that the death causes and a direct pecuniary in-
jury in the loss of services rendered by the decedent to them.
SURVIVAL STATES
The pecuniary interests of both groups receive substantial protection
in a "survival" jurisdiction.' 2 In such states, recovery under the survival
statute is, essentially, what the decedent would have recovered. Damages
include expenses (medical and others), pain and suffering,' 3 and loss of
earnings, all to date of death. Recovery also includes loss of future
11In recent years life insurance has become a common security device, and
not infrequently, a loan requirement.
12 Of course the failure to impose liability in the case of "instantaneous"
death would be a major defect. See supra note 6.
13 The inclusion of the decedent's pain and suffering as an item of damages
in an action brought after death is somewhat dubious. It appears to result from
mechanical reasoning by- both courts and legislatures-the decedent could have
recovered this and therefore the item "survived." Perhaps the best ground for its
allowance is that while creditors and dependents may have no particular claim to
such damages, neither does the defendant have any particularly strong ground
upon which to protest liability. The Iowa court excluded pain and suffering. See
Jones, Civil Liability for Wrongful Death in Io'wa, 11 IowA L. REV. 28 (1925).
[Vol. 19
DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DEATH
earning capacity, computed with reference to the decedent's life ex-
pectancy.'
4
Since the recovery is administered as an asset of the estate, creditors
receive all the protection they could ask. On the other hand, the eco-
nomic impact of death upon the decedent's family and dependents may
be so drastic that it would seem highly desirable social policy to make
some provision for their need.' The most obvious method of dealing
with the problem would be to make a portion of the survival action
recovery payable to the dependents free from the claims of creditors.
Creditors are generally accorded priority in the administration of a
decedent's estate, although there are certain basic exemption provisions.'
6
These provisions are designed to deal with all types of estates. Any
substantial increase in the general exemptions would affect the whole field
of decedents' estates. Some specific provision on recoveries under the
survival statute would appear necessary.
However, while the pecuniary interest derived from the decedent is
covered by the survival statute approach, no recovery is usually accorded
the dependents for any direct pecuniary loss suffered by them (such as
the value of the decedent's services), nor for the non-pecuniary injuries
arising from death, grief, etc.'7
Survival statutes commonly contain no specific provision on the
effect of judgments or releases 'by the injured person during. life. How-
ever, since the personal representative is said to be suing on the decedent's
cause of action, he is in "privity" with, and bound by, the action of the
decedent. Commonly, therefore, the extinguishment of the cause of
action by either judgment or valid release operates to bar any action
under the survival statute.' 8
However valid that reasoning may be from the viewpoint of statu-
14 There has been extensive disagreement on the computation. The measures
suggested vary from gross earnings at one extreme to accumulation (amount de-
cedent would have saved) at the other. See Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461,
45 A.2d 789 (1946). From the viewpoint of compensating creditors and dependents
or others, gross earnings less living expenses (net earnings) would seem the proper
measure.
15 Bankruptcy, wage-earner trusteeships, garnishment exemption and other
"debtor" laws, plus the willingness of creditors to go along with a debtor demon-
strating good faith by even token payments, enables one earning income to devote
a substantial portion of it to his family. In the death action, those earnings become
a lump sum, are reduced to present worth, and the recovery is immediately subject
to the payment of all debts in full. Thus, realistically, the family may be left in a
considerably worse position.
16 OHio REV. CODE §2115.13 exempts from the administration an amount, in
property or money, which in no event can exceed $2500.00. OHIO REV. CODE
§§2117.20-24 provide for a "Year's Allowance" for the support of a widow and
children under eighteen.
17 Whether the non-pecuniary injury is in fact excluded by juries is another
question. See discussion infra.
Is Cogswell v. Boston & M.R. Co., 78 N.H. 379, 101 Ati. 145 (1917).
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tory interpretation, it hardly explains why the action should be barred.
Looking to the damage interests, the point to note is that "privity" should
be found to prevent duplication of damages. The damages recoverable
in an action by the injured person during life are, or should be, exactly
the same as those recoverable in the survival action.' 9 To permit the sur-
vival action would thus result in double recovery.20
There being no specific recognition given in these States to the needs
of the family as a matter of social policy, nor to any direct injury
(pecuniary or non-pecuniary) suffered 'by those benefiting from the sur-
vival action, the bar by judgment or release of the survival action does
no great violence to the damage interests of the various persons. The
same derivative expectation interests exist in any case of permanent non-
fatal injury. The legislature not having seen fit to accord a greater de-
gree of protection in cases involving death, the courts have simply
followed the usual rules.
STATES WITH CONCURRENT REMEDIES
In states where two concurrent actions and recoveries are permitted,
one under a survival and one under a wrongful death statute, the duality
of remedies presents peculiar damage problems.
The measure of recovery in the wrongful death action is generally
based on the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries of the action. In a few
states, it is the loss to the "estate." Under either view, this loss includes
an amount measured 'by reference to the decedent's earning capacity
over his life expectancy. 2 ' As previously noted, survival jurisdictions
grant recovery for the decedent's loss of earning capacity in the survival
action. To follow that view in a concurrent remedy state would result
in duplication of damages. The portion of future earning capacity re-
coverable in the wrongful death action would simply be a segment
carved from the larger recovery obtained in the survival action. 22
19 On the right of a living plaintiff to recover loss of earning capacity where
an injury decreases life expectancy, see Duffey, Life Expectancy and Loss of
Earning Capacity, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 314 (1958). If the recovery by a living
plaintiff were limited to the date of probable actual death (i.e., expectancy as
shortened by the injury), there would be no duplication on that item, and the
operation of a judgment or release as a total bar could not be justified on the
ground of duplication of damages.
20 A judgment for the injured person during life may not, of course, cover
the damages in full because of an error or mistake. Releases may be given for
inadequate consideration. A judgment may be against the plaintiff. In none of
these instances is there double payment in fact. It would, however, be within the
meaning of "double recovery." The point is discussed further infra.
21As in survival states, the courts vary on the amount of the decedent's
gross earning capacity which is recoverable. See supra note 14. For the purposes
of this article it is only necessary to notice that under all views, the recovery in-
cludes some portion of future earning capacity. It should also be noted that in
many cases, this item of damage is the only really substantial one.
2244 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1931). For two excellent analyses of this duplication
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Duplication is avoided by the simple device of limiting recovery in
the survival action to the date of death.2 3 The wrongful death action
then picks up loss of earning capacity from death to date of life expect-
ancy prior to injury. While the reasoning employed in many of the
cases is fallacious,24 there can be no doubt that the basis for limiting the
pecuniary losses in a survival action to the date of death is the avoidance
of duplication of damages and that the limitation is a judge-made rule,
created in an attempt to reconcile the operation of the two statutes.25
The result of such tailoring is that: 1. In the survival action, the
principal damages recoverable are expenses, pain and suffering, and loss
of earnings, all to date of death; 2. In the wrongful death action, the
principal damages are all or a portion of the loss of earning capacity
from death to date of life expectancy prior to injury, and the pecuniary
value of the decedent's services.2 6
The impact that this judicial cutting and fitting has upon the dis-
tribution of damages is peculiar. The arbitrary, even if necessary, di-
vision of damages between the two actions has a direct effect upon the
creditors' interest. Their interest certainly extends to loss of earnings
and the expenses incurred by the decedent .before death which deplete
the estate. That recovery is available to creditors since it passes through
the estate under the survival statute. But the creditors' main concern lies
in the lost future earnings. It is this loss which inflicts the greatest injury
on creditors and which constitutes the primary damage item in those cases
in which creditors are likely to have the greatest interest-the death of
a wage or salary earner. Yet participation in the recovery of prospective
damages is completely denied to the creditors. All of that recovery is
allocated to thc wrongful death action and does not pass through the
estate. 27 Certainly the interests of the dependents justify exempting a
of damages, see Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes,
23 MIcH. L. REV. 114 (1924); REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION [OF NEw
YORK] 199 (1935).
23 See Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co. 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806
(1922) ; Allen v. Burdette, 139 Ohio St. 208, 39 N.E.2d 153 (1942).
24 In Allen v. Burdette, supra note 23, the court stated that death "estab-
lished" the decedent's life expectancy and therefore recovery could not extend
past death. Where death occurs from other causes, the person's life span is obvi-
ously established as a fact. But it would seem rather patent that death caused by
the injury itself cannot possibly have any bearing on what the life span would
have been without the injury. The court was either simply begging the question
or stating a conclusion without recognizing the issue.
25 See articles cited note 22 supra. Thus, in these states, damages in a
survival action do not strictly follow the survival theory or concept. A living
person can, or should be able to, recover over his life expectancy as it existed
prior to injury and not merely to the date of his probable actual death due to the
injury. See supra note 19.
26 Non-pecuniary injuries are generally not recoverable, at least in theory.
See discussion infra.
27 Exemption of the wrongful death recovery from claims of creditors results
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substantial portion of the future earnings recovery from the claims of
creditors. However, it is questionable whether the complete exemption
which results from this judicial balancing is justifiable.
The peculiarities go deeper. Occasionally, but not rarely, the desig-
nated beneficiaries do not survive the decedent, or perhaps die before
judgment. A fair number of states hold that in such circumstances, no
action lies under the wrongful death statute.2  Under these holdings,
the wrongdoer escapes all liability for the loss of future earning capacity
despite the fact that creditors may suffer substantial injury. Correction
of this result would require the creation of an exception to the rule
limiting damages in the survival action. Even though the rule seems
clearly 'based on policy grounds rather than statutory interpretation, few
courts would be willing to so boldly tailor the statutes. Kriesak v.
Crowe" is an unusual, and commendably frank handling of the prob-
lem. The action was under the survival statute, and it appeared that no
wrongful death action could be ibrought. Recognizing that the limitation
of damages in survival actions was based on the avoidance of duplication,
the court held that loss of earning capacity in the survival action should
be computed on the decedent's normal life expectancy. a0
Wrongful death statutes also have a marked effect on the distribu-
tion of damages among the dependents and others who had an expecta-
tion of economic benefit from the decedent. The statutes vary greatly
on exactly to whom, and in what proportion, the recovery is distributed.
Beyond the immediate family, it is difficult to generalize. Commonly,
recovery is limited to next of kin, and non-relative dependents are
excluded. While this is also true of intestacy statutes, it would seem
that such persons might be accorded protection in this area. Certainly,
in a fair number of cases the probability of loss to them greatly exceeds
that which could be shown by relatives. The existence of non-relative
dependents is recognized in our tax laws. It seems somewhat unrealistic
to refuse recognition in this area of wrongful death. Similarly, such
statutes operate to prevent inheritance under the decedent's will.3 '
from both express provision and the application of the "new cause of action"
theory. Many of the statutes are noted in 44 HA~v. L. REv. 980 (1931). As might
be expected, the States are not uniform on this point and in some the decedent's
creditors may be able -to reach the recovery under some circumstances. Cf. infra
note 31.
28Many cases are collected in 43 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1955).
2936 F. Supp. 127 (D.C. Pa. 1941), followed in Kriesak v. Crowe, 44 F.
Supp. 636 (D.C. Pa. 1942), azffrmcd, 131 F.2d 1023 (C.C.A. 3d 1942).
30 For another very interesting "tailoring job" on this problem, see Pezzuli v.
D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942). A comment on the Pennsylvania
law, including both the Kriesak and Pezzuli cases, may be found in 91 U. PA. L.
REv. 68 (1942).
31 Cf. ORE. REV. STAT. §30.020 where the action is "for the benefit of the
surviving spouse and dependents and in case there is no surviving spouse or
dependents, then for the benefit of the estate of the decedent."
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Under this "Lord Campbell" or "new cause of action" approach,
the determination of who should participate, and the extent of participa-
tion, is obviously a vexing problem. Considering all those persons and
institutions who might reasonably have expected to receive an economic
benefit from the decedent, it is impossible to arrive at a perfect solution.
The problem is inherently one of reasonable probability plus social policy.
Certainly the fact that the decedent's will at the time of his premature
death provided for a certain distribution is no assurance of what he
would have done had he lived. It might be commented, however, that
the law of testate and intestate succession contains a pattern of distribu-
tion which is firmly planted and, in its general outline, well known.
It would seem desirable to use that pattern as at least a backstop rather
than simply release the wrongdoer from liability.
Regardless of the ibeneficiary problem, the present division of
damages seems utterly arbitrary. Creditors have as great an interest as
do the dependents and others in the loss of the decedent's earning capa-
city. On the other hand, the latter have as great a claim as do creditors
upon the recovery for expenses, pain and suffering and loss of earnings
to date of death."2 Yet as a result of the judicial balancing of the two
statutes, distribution is by item of damage rather than upon any con-
sidered policy decision of -the extent of damage interest.3 An approach
based un weighing the various interests on a percentage or minimum
amount of the total recovery of damages would seem a far more
appropriate method of handling the distribution.
Under most wrongful death statutes, recovery is limited by statute
or judicial decision to pecuniary damages.3 4 Where recovery is based
on loss to the beneficiaries, this includes the pecuniary value to the
beneficiaries of the decedent's services-an item not recoverable under a
simple survival approach. The item is not of great importance in cases
where the decedent had any substantial future earning capacity. But
where the decedent was a non-wage earner--and particularly, an infant-
it assumes an importance as the only apparent foundation for the wrong-
3 2 Assuming that the beneficiaries of the wrongful death action are sub-
stantially the same as those sharing in the estate (and that assets exceed liabilities),
the beneficiaries will, of course, benefit from the survival action.
33 The "new cause of action" concept is so deeply ingrained that it is easy
to lose sight of the very substantial identity of damage interest in the survival
and wrongful death recoveries. Not infrequently reference is made to damages to
the estate as "distinct" from the loss to the beneficiaries under the wrongful death
statute. Much of this confusion may arise from an underlying assumption that a
living plaintiff cannot recover loss of earning capacity for a period of decreased
life expectancy and that therefore no such recovery is possible in a survival action.
As previously pointed out, the assumption appears to be erroneous both as to the
right of a living plaintiff and as to the basis of the limitation in survival actions.
See supra notes 19, 22 and 23.
3 OHio REV. CODE §2125.02; Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S.
59 (1913).
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ful death action.3 5 In this connection, it should be noted that the pecuniary
damage limitation excludes, at least in theory, recovery for grief, loss
of companionship, etc., incurred as a result of the death. But the size
of verdicts returned by juries and upheld by the courts in non-wage
earner cases would indicate that the value of services is merely a vehicle
for the recovery of the non-pecuniary injury in fact.36
The extreme difficulty of measuring such an intangible injury,
and the consequent inability to establish standards for controlling both
the jury and judge, probably accounts for the refusal openly to recognize
mental distress and related injury. The whole pecuniary damage concept
might best be viewed, at least today, as simply a device for controlling
excessive awards without any real intent or desire actually to exclude
the item from the jury's verdict. If that be true, there is much reason
seriously to consider the forthright position of Wisconsin. In that state,
recovery for mental distress is specifically allowed, but simply restricted
to $2500.00. 37
In the light of these considerations, it may be doubted if there is
any real distinction between survival states and concurrent remedy states
on the damages which are recoverable in fact.
The concurrent remedy approach has also given rise to confusion
on the effect of a judgment or valid release obtained during the life
of the injured person.3" The survival action generally is held to be barred
by a judgment in these states just as in "survival" states. The reasons
are also the same: (1) the cause of action is "the decedent's cause of
action," and (2) a complete duplication of damages exists.39 Valid releases
also operate as a 'bar for similar reasons. There is, of course, an existing
body of law dealing with the validity of releases. Again as pointed out
previously, the very real interest of the dependents and of the community
itself in any settlement by, the decedent suggests that attention may
well be given to whether the existing law adequately copes with the
problems of releases for an "inadequate" but legally "sufficient" amount.
35 For an exhaustive annotation on recovery for the death of an infant, see
14- A.L.R. 2d 485 (1950).
36See PRoSSER, TORTS, §105, p. 715 (2d ed. 1955).
37 Mueller v. Silver Fleet Trucking Co., 245 Wis. 458, 37 N.W.2d 66 (1949).
38 A somewhat analogous problem arises with respect to the running of
limitations against the decedent during his life. However, the limitations applicable
to any type of death action are so complex a matter and include so many side issues
that they are riot considered here. See 132 A.L.R. 292 (1941) ; 167 A.L.R. 894
(1947).
39 A judgment may not, in fact, cover all the damages, or may cover them for
an insufficient period. Such a circumstance is simply an error of fact occurring in
the personal injury action. On principles of finality of decision, the judgment should
be considered conclusive as to all damages that could or should have been recover-
able. A judgment against the injured person should operate as a bar on principles
of mutuality. To hold otherwise would be to sanction "double jeopardy" in civil
liability. It should be remembered in both of these instances that error is no
respector of sides and works as much against defendants as against plaintiffs.
[Vol. 19
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However, the courts split when it comes to the question of whether
the wrongful death action is barred.4" The majority of courts hold that
the wrongful death action is dependent upon the existence of a cause of
action in the decedent at the time of his death. Thus if the decedent's
cause of action is merged in a judgment or validly released, the require-
ments of the statute are not met. The minority say that the cause of
action depends on conditions at the time of injury, and the decedent
cannot by his subsequent conduct affect a cause of action in favor of
others, and which doesn't even accrue until death.".
With due respect to all the judges who have so often repeated
these arguments, neither statement is persuasive, and, on the wording
of the statutes, both come perilously close to mere conclusions. On the
literal wording of the statutes, neither interpretation can be said to be
unreasonable. If the statutory language is clear, a court must follow it.
But where two or more interpretations are available, general policy
considerations should control. Nor is the minority view appreciably
strengthened by resort to the "new cause of action" theory. To strenu-
ously argue that the personal representative acts in two capacities and
therefore that no "privity" (and no res judicata) exists between the
parties would certainly seem to be a mere conclusion.42 The question
would really be better stated as one of whether Cprivity," or "estoppel,"
should be found. As the length of Freeman's treatise43 attests, it is not
unusual to extend such concepts in a new situation, here a statutorily
created remedy, if basic policy reasons appear to require the extension.44
In an action 'by a living plaintiff, recovery extends to the loss of
earning capacity over the life expectancy as it existed prior to injury.45
The recovery in the wrongful death action based on the decedent's
future earning capacity is thus simply a portion or segment of the larger
recovery obtained by the injured person himself in the personal injury
action. The result of the minority view is thus to impose double liability
upon the defendant and require double payment for the same loss.46
4039 A.L.R. 579 (1925), supplemented in 99 A.L.R. 1091 (1935). In a
number of states, e.g. Ohio, no clearly authoritative decision exists.
41 The case of Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915), is
probably the leading authority for the minority view.
42Taking the two-capacity approach, the discussion should probably be
directed at estoppel by bar rather than res judicata. For arguments of this type
see Ohio's Wrongful Death Statute, 4 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 38 (1955); 18
U. CiN. L. REv. 548 (1949).
43 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925).
44 In the almost converse situation of successive or concurrent joint tort-
feasors, the courts had no great difficulty creating a bar despite lack of "privity."
45 Hallada v. Great Northern Railway, 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673 (1953) ;
Prairie Creek Coal Min. Co. v. Kittrell, 106 Ark. 237, 153 S.W. 89 (1912). See
cases collected in Duffey, Life Expectancy and Loss of Earning Capacity, 19 OHIO
ST. L.J. 314 (195S).
40 Of course, if a court were to deny an injured person the right to recover
full compensation for his own injuries by limiting his recovery to the date of
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In this connection it is important to distinguish a judgment during
the injured person's life from a judgment under the survival statute.
The limitation of survival damages to date of death excludes loss of
earning capacity from a survival recovery. Therefore, it is apparent that
because of that rule, the damages recoverable in survival and wrongful
death are distinct and do not overlap.47 Accordingly, there is no reason
why judgment in a survival action should bar the wrongful death action,
or vice versa.48 Considering that the basis of the damage limitation in
survival actions was the prevention of double recovery, it is difficult
to explain why the courts following the minority view have failed to
recognize the same point in the situation of judgments during life.49
The opinion of the Nebraska court in Hindmarsh v. Sulpho-Saline
Bath Co.,50 contains a very thorough discussion of the overlap of damages
between personal injury, survival and wrongful death actions. The court
pointed out that the injured person can recover for his total loss of
earning capacity and that a judgment during life should bar -both the
survival and wrongful death actions. The opinion then discusses the
similar double payment that would arise from the two death actions
unless the survival recovery is limited. The court emphatically stated
that any such double liability-a recovery which exceeds the total loss
sustained--constitutes punitive or exemplary damages.5
In the absence of a specific statutory or constitutional provision,
the great weight of authority holds that no punitive or exemplary
probable actual death, there would be no double liability. See MCCORMIcK,
DAMAGES, §86, p. 303-304 (1935 ed.).
47The distinction between "revival" and "survival" should be, but has not
necessarily been, merely procedural. Where death occurs during a pending action
and before judgment, and the action is revived and judgment obtained, double
recovery will result unless the damages are limited to loss of earnings to date of
death in accordance with the survival rule.
48 No reason, that is, based on over-lapping damages. This article is not
concerned with the justification for inconsistent judgments based on the same facts
and other aspects of the concurrent remedy approach.
49 The confusion may stem from a misconception of the common law death
rules. Thus in Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes.
23 MicH. L. REv. 114 (1924), the author makes an excellent analysis of the double
recovery problem presented by the inter-play of survival and wrongful death
actions in a concurrent remedy state. However, the article assumes, and in one
place states, that a recovery by the injured person does not present such a problem.
A similar assumption appears in De Hart v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio App. 62,
85 N.E.2d 586 (1948), where the court held that a judgment for the defendant in
an action by the injured person did not bar a wrongful death action. The Supreme
Court of Ohio has never directly passed on a case involving a judgment by a
living plaintiff.
50 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806 (1922).
51 A careful discussion of double recovery may also be found in Fontheim v.
Third Ave. Ry. Co., 257 App.,Div. 147, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (1939). See also REPORT
OF TmE LAW REvIsION COMMISSION [OF NEw YORK], 48 (1935).
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damages may be awarded in wrongful death.52 In those states permitting
punitive damages, the recovery is based on the conventional tort distinc-
tion of gross or wilful negligence, etc., as the case may 'be in that state.
5 3
The punitive damages resulting from the failure to bar a wrongful
death action would not be based on the degree of culpability of the
defendant's conduct. The basis would simply be that death had resulted.
It would seem that basic policy dictates the confinement of damages
to compensation and that a court should refuse to impose punishment
in the absence of explicit statutory provision.
It is, of course, true that the pecuniary value of the decedent's
services is recoverable in wrongful death but not in the personal injury
action-at least as to services that would have been rendered after the
date of probable actual death. The same point was previously mentioned
with respect to survival actions. In many states, a husband can recover
for the loss of his wife's services, but others generally cannot sue for
such a loss. This deficiency, if it be one, would seem a problem of general
tort law. It would perhaps he possible to treat a judgment as only a
partial bar by simply limiting the wrongful death action to loss of
services. However, such an approach would probably accentuate the
problem of jury verdicts based on grief and mental distress. Before
engaging in such a course of action, a legislative re-appraisal of the
whole non-pecuniary injury problem would seem desirable.54
Releases present a similar situation. It is true that releases are
sometimes given for trifling sums and the injured person subsequently
dies from his injuries. Such things are, of course, unfortunate. But they
arise from the inherent inability to determine exactly the extent of a
person's injuries-just as it is difficult to determine with certainty the
defendant's liability. Here, as in judgments during life, the speculative
elements are on both sides of the fence. Assuming a release is given
as an accord and satisfaction,5 5 it is supported by the same policy con-
siderations that apply to judgments.
The legislature might well consider requiring the dependents' in-
terests to be specifically taken into account in settlements of personal
injury claims. As to the courts, Judge Smith's strong dissent in Rowe v.
Richards58 puts the matter very well:
It would be idle to discuss the wisdom or justice of legislation
52 See cases cited in 14 A.L.R.2d at 538.
53 See 61 HARv. L. REV. 169 (1947).
54 Wisconsin's specific recognition of the non-pecuniary injury previously
discussed, presents a somewhat different question. Partial bar, leaving recovery
on that item open, would seem possible under the Wisconsin statute. Failure to
recover in fact in the personal injury action, as well as judgments for the defend-
ant, should operate as a bar. See supra note 39.
55 On the failure of American law adequately to distinguish releases from
releases in satisfaction in the almost converse situation of "joint" tortfeasors, see
PROSSER, TORTS, §46, p. 243 (2nd ed. 1955).56 8upra note 41.
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which might require the wife's right to future support to be
taken into account when settlements are made in his lifetime
for personal injuries to the husband. We need only observe
that at the present time the law does not require it, no matter
what may -be the extent of the injury.
It has also been suggested that, since the defendant must consider
future liability, the minority view allowing suit despite a judgment or
release many affect the procurement of settlements, and compound the
problem of adequate payment." In this respect, it is interesting to note
the dilemma of Ohio attorneys arising from the unsettled law in that
state. A release by the beneficiaries would operate to bar the wrongful
death action. However, while the family of the injured person may be
willing to join in a release, the parent may not be able to bind a minor
child."8 Resort to the Probate Court may also be ineffective.
5 9
"ONE REMEDY" STATES
To round off the picture of the judicial tailors at work, several
comments on one-remedy states are appropriate. These states are those
in which the survival action and wrongful death action are considered
as being mutually exclusive."0 This interpretation of the statutes is also
probably ,based on a desire to avoid duplication of damages between the
survival and wrongful death actions. 1 It does not, of course, avoid
the similar problem which arises between a personal injury judgment
or a release during life and the wrongful death action.
62
The one-remedy view has a very drastic effect on the interests of
creditors. In any case where the wrongful death statute applies, creditors
are completely cut off. However, in "compensation" for this result,
survival actions allow creditors to come out ahead of their brethren in
a concurrent remedy state since loss of earning capacity is recoverable.
57 Dibble v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 25 Barb. 183 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1857);
Littlewood v. City of New York, 89 N.Y. 24 (1882).
5Sphillips v. Community Traction Co., 46 Ohio App. 483, 189 N.E. 444
(1933), motion to certify overruled, 1933.
59 In Traci, Ohio's Wrongful Death Statute, 4 CLE.-MAiL L. REV. 38 (1955),
the author states that one Ohio Probate Court refused approval on the ground of
lack of authority. The article also points out that the Negligence Committee of
the Ohio State Bar Association twice proposed a statute making judgments and
releases during life operate as a bar to wrongful death actions.
60 E.g. Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 305 Ill. App. 473, 27 N.E.2d 285
(1940).
61 See articles cited in note 21 supra.
62 In Illinois, a lower court has held that a living plaintiff cannot recover
the loss of earning capacity beyond his life expectancy in his injured condition.
Krakowski v. Aurora E. & C. Ry. Co., 167 Ill. App. 469 (1912). This appears to
be the only such holding reported in America. The case is discussed in Duffey,
Life Expectancy and Loss of Earning Capacity, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 314 (1958).
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CONCLUSION
The development of principles and doctrines to cope with all the
aspects of tort damages has taken many years of evolution and the work
of many minds. Much still remains to be done. In the field of death,
development was arrested by the arbitrary common law rules. Certainly
it is expecting too much of the late Lord Campbell to assume that in
one swoop he was capable of drafting a statute that would adequately
fill the hole left in our law. But with over 112 years of experience to
draw upon, it does not seem to be asking too much of the legal profession
and the legislatures to expect an effort to improve and refine Lord
Campbell's work. The present day statutes, of whatever type, are
inadequate. No mention has even been made of the complexities that
have arisen in the area of conflicts of law.
Perhaps this article is more destructive than constructive in its
criticism. However, its purpose is simply to suggest a basic conceptual
approach to wrongful death-one based on damage interests and not on
labels such as "survival" or "new cause of action." And comfort can
be taken in the thought that knowledge of the inadequacies of the present
day law is essential to adequate new legislation.
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